In retrospect, the agreed framework was not the success it seemed to have at the time of its signing. The United States and North Korea failed to normalize relations, and North Korea regularly blocked IAEA inspections. In October 2002, North Korea acknowledged that it had established a separate uranium-based nuclear weapons production program. The United States, meanwhile, has suspended supplies of heavy fuel oil and halted construction of light-water reactors. In retaliation, North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, extorted all IAEA inspectors and reactivated its plutonium program in Yongongbyong, thus terminating the agreement. As a result, negotiations over North Korea`s nuclear program have become a broader process, known as the six-party talks, involving the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. Formal negotiations between the two nations began on 8 July 1994 and the final agreement was signed on 21 October. The document contained five principles. First, the United States and an international consortium would build two light-water reactors in North Korea by 2003. In return, the North Koreans would freeze all activities at Yongongbyong and allow IAEA inspectors to monitor the facility. Second, North Korea would submit to all IAEA inspections.
Third, the U.S. would supply 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea annually until the light-water reactors are completed. Fourth, the two nations would have normalized diplomatic relations. Finally, North Korea agreed to resume political dialogue with South Korea. The agreement offered hope for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. There were also a few confidential protocols that supported the agreement, which were not made public.   This includes applying comprehensive IAEA security measures when the main non-nuclear components of the first LTR unit were completed, but prior to the supply of important nuclear components.  The United States viewed the agreed framework as a non-proliferation agreement, while North Korea placed greater emphasis on measures to normalize relations with the United States.  Shortly after the agreement was signed, control of the US Congress passed to the Republican Party, which did not support the agreement.  Some Republican senators were strongly opposed to the deal and saw it as appeasement.   Originally, U.S. Department of Defense emergency funds, which were not under congressional control, were used to finance transitional oil deliveries under the agreement with international funds. From 1996, Congress released funds, but not always sufficient amounts.   As a result, some of the agreed transitional oil deliveries were delivered late.  KEDO`s first director, Stephen Bosworth, then commented, “The agreed framework was a political orphan within two weeks of its signing.”  Toward the end of her second term, the Clinton administration made some progress in achieving this aspect of the framework, notably when Madeleine Albright, then Secretary of State, visited Pyongyang in October 2000. . .