Lazkano I, Marrouch W, Nkuiya B (2016) Adaptation to climate change: What is the impact of the heterogeneity of adaptation costs on climate coalitions? About Dev Econ 21 (06): 812-838 This paper examines the impact of adjustment on the stability of an international emissions agreement. To solve this problem, we solve a three-step coalition game, in which countries will decide, first, whether or not to sign the agreement. In the second phase, the signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (individually) choose their emission values. Finally, each country in the third phase does not decide on its level of adaptation in a cooperative manner. We solve this game for two models. For both, the damage caused by emissions is linear, which ensures that emissions are strategic complements in the second phase of the game. However, when the model is first adapted, the emission limit damage is reduced in a multiplier way, while for the second, the reduction is additive. Our analysis shows that the models provide different predictions in terms of participation. In the first case, we find that the greater the benefits of full cooperation, the greater the cooperation. However, in the second case, the single stable agreement consists of three countries, regardless of the benefits of full cooperation.
These results indicate that complementarity may play a role in promoting cooperation, but is not a sufficient condition for increased participation in an emissions agreement. Finally, we would like to point out that our research indicates that the way adaptation reduces damage plays a decisive role in the outcome of the coalition game. The assumption (g) confirms the standard adjustment compromise: higher adjustment levels reduce the marginal benefit of the reduction and vice versa. Assumption (h) indicates that higher weakening determines the effectiveness of adaptive measures. This increases the marginal benefits of adaptation. The sign of the total addition of the adjustment and mitigation cross (`B_ B_` the first negative (`> varepsilon_ B_ varepsilon_ B_ < B_ B_` The addition of adaptation emphasizes different results. depending on whether the effectiveness of adaptation and the incentives for free movement in the international environmental agreements concluded by Psi < "Psi") are " Psi”) and “Freeride-Incentives” in international environmental agreements. Center Discussion Paper Series No 2011-2120 Payment functions are square-square. The parameters b, g, c, β, e, f and d are considered strictly positive. Footnote 12 The M and M-A games are directly comparable, as the former can be obtained in order to place the adjustment level to zero in the second. We can draw two important political implications from our work.
The first is that a common negotiation on mitigation and adaptation always seems better. While the mitigation and adjustment of substitutes and reaction functions decrease, adjustment increases the number of stable coalitions. This is a potentially positive message in the context of a fragmented regime or a bottom-up approach to climate negotiations, as advocated by the Paris Agreement. By supporting adaptation in developing countries, for example, developed countries could stimulate the creation of “clubs” that could be a starting point for achieving new mitigation targets. If mitigation and adaptation are complementary and the reaction function is negative, joint negotiations on mitigation and adaptation can lead to the formation of a broad, stable coalition.